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PREVAILING WAGE LEGISLATION AND THE
CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE
David E. Bernstein†

Research on how twentieth-century government regulation of economic activity
contributed to the oppression of African Americans has traditionally focused on Jim
Crow legislation in the American South. More recently, scholars have documented
the ways that other types of government regulation, ranging from federal and state
labor laws1 to federal housing and mortgage policies,2 have harmed African
Americans.3 The contribution of federal, state, and local regulation to racial
inequality received significant mainstream attention thanks to the publication of TaNehisi Coates’ much discussed-essay, The Case for Reparations.4 It is therefore a
propitious time to examine the largely unknown discriminatory origins and effects of
prevailing wage legislation.
Since the early twentieth century, labor unions have lobbied federal and state
governments to enact and enforce laws requiring government contractors to pay
“prevailing wages” to employees on public works projects. These laws, currently
active at the federal level and in approximately thirty states,5 typically in practice
require that contractors pay according to the local union wage scale. The laws also
require employers to adhere to union work rules.6 The combination of these rules
† University Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University. The author thanks
Armand Thieblot for helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR
REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL (2001); PAUL D. MORENO,
BLACKS AND ORGANIZED LABOR: A NEW HISTORY (2008); Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor
Standards Act: Racial Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335 (1987).
2. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017); Florence Wagman Roisman, Intentional
Racial Discrimination and Segregation by the Federal Government as a Principal Cause of Concentrated
Poverty: A Response to Schill and Wachter, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1351 (1995).
3. See generally IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF
RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2005); DESMOND KING, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL:
BLACK AMERICANS AND THE US FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1995).
4. Ta-Nehisi
Coates,
The
Case
for
Reparations,
ATLANTIC
(June
2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631.
5. Dollar Threshold Amount for Contract Coverage Under State Prevailing Wage Laws, DEP’T OF LAB.
WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, https://www.dol.gov/whd/state/dollar.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2017).
6. See ARMAND J. THIEBLOT, JR., PREVAILING WAGE LEGISLATION: THE DAVIS-BACON ACT, STATE
“LITTLE DAVIS-BACON” ACTS, AND THE SERVICE CONTRACT ACT (1986) [hereinafter THIEBLOT, PREVAILING
WAGE LEGISLATION]. In some jurisdictions, the law is skewed to make the “prevailing wage” equivalent to a
hypothetical, higher union wage, rather than to follow what union workers actually get from private contracts.
See ARMAND THIEBLOT, THE CASE AGAINST THE DAVIS-BACON ACT: 54 REASONS FOR REPEAL (2013)
[hereinafter THIEBLOT, THE CASE AGAINST THE DAVIS-BACON ACT] (contending that instead of reflecting local
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makes it extremely difficult for nonunion contractors to compete for public works
contracts.7
Meanwhile, construction unions have been among the most persistently
exclusionary institutions in American society.8 Not surprisingly, in many cases the
history of prevailing wage legislation has been intertwined with the history of racial
discrimination. Economists and others argue that prevailing wage legislation
continues to have discriminatory effects on minorities today. Union advocates, not
surprisingly, deny that prevailing wage laws have discriminatory effects. More
surprisingly, they deny that the granddaddy of modern prevailing wage legislation,
the federal Davis-Bacon Act of 1931, had discriminatory intent.9
Part I of this Article discusses the discriminatory history of the most significant
of all prevailing wage laws, the Davis-Bacon Act. As discussed below, Davis-Bacon
was passed with the explicit intent of excluding African American workers from
federal construction projects, and its discriminatory effects continued for decades.
Part II of this Article discusses the controversy over whether prevailing wage
legislation continues to have discriminatory effects. The section begins with a
discussion of the empirical literature on the effects of prevailing wage discrimination
on minority employment. The section next presents evidence that construction
unions continue to discriminate against members of minority groups, albeit much
more subtly than in the past. The section concludes by recounting allegations that
prevailing wage legislation serves to exclude minority contractors from obtaining
government contracts.

wages, prevailing wage laws inflate them); E.J. MCMAHON & KENT GARDNER, PREVAILING WASTE: NEW
YORK’S
COSTLY
PUBLIC
WORKS
PAY
MANDATE
(2017),
https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/prevailing-waste.
7. “Davis-Bacon mandates inflated wage rates . . . and creates rigid job classifications and procedures
which, though standard operating procedure for unions, are anathema to small non-unionized firms.” Removing
Barriers to Opportunity: A Constitutional Challenge to the Davis-Bacon Act, INST. FOR JUST.,
http://ij.org/case/brazier-construction-co-inc-v-reich/#backgrounder (last visited Apr. 6, 2018).
8. See, e.g., Charles S. Johnson, Negro Workers and the Unions, SURVEY (Apr. 15, 1928), at 113–14. The
article reveals that as of 1927, “Practically none” of the members of the electricians’ union were African
American, the sheet metal workers’ union had no African Americans among its 25,000 members, the plasterers’
unions had only 100 African American members among its 30,000 members, despite the presence of 6,000
African Americans in the trade, the plumbers and steam fitters had “a long history” of successfully maneuvering
to avoid admitting African American members, and the carpenters had 340,000 members, among whom only
592 were African American.
9. See, e.g., PETER PHILIPS, THOUGHTLESS THINK TANKS: FACTOID SCHOLARSHIP AND SOUND BITE
THINKING ABOUT THE HISTORY AND INTENT OF PREVAILING WAGE LAWS 7 (2001). It should be noted that
Philips writes, in reference to me, “An extensive literature search does not show that Bernstein ever wrote on
this topic before or after” a briefing paper I wrote about the Davis-Bacon Act published by the Cato Institute in
January 1993. In fact, between then and when Philips’ paper was published, I wrote the following papers that
discussed prevailing wage legislation in detail: The Shameful, Wasteful History of New York’s Prevailing Wage
Law, 7 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1 (1997); The Davis-Bacon Act: Vestige of Jim Crow, 13 NAT’L BLACK
L.J. 276 (1994); EMPIRE FOUND. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, IT’S TIME TO REFORM NEW YORK’S PREVAILING
WAGE LAW, (1993); and Roots of the ‘Underclass’: The Decline of Laissez-faire Jurisprudence and the Rise
of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 85 (1993). So much for Philips’ “extensive literature search.”
In fairness, Philips does acknowledge that state public works legislation, including prevailing wage laws, was
used to exclude Chinse workers in the West, African American workers in Louisiana, and foreign workers in
New York.
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THE DAVIS-BACON ACT OF 1931

The Davis-Bacon Act10 is a federal prevailing wage law that applies to any
construction project that receives federal funding. Excluding competitors, especially
nonwhite and immigrant competitors, from public works projects was an early goal
of construction unions. A Louisiana statute limited employment on public works to
those who had paid their poll tax.11 Early Oregon and California statutes banned the
use of Chinese laborers on public works projects,12 and a New York statute banned
the use of aliens generally.13 Courts invalidated each of the laws as violations of
liberty of contract and/or equal protection guarantees.14
By the mid-1920s, New York was one of several states to require contractors on
public-works projects to pay their employees the “prevailing wage.” The prevailing
wage was generally set at least as high as union wages to prevent union workers from
being undercut by their competitors, including African Americans excluded from the
unions. The law, however, only applied to state, not federal, contractors.
In 1927, Algernon Blair, a contractor from Alabama, received a federal contract
to build a Veteran’s Bureau hospital in Long Island, New York. The contractor
employed primarily itinerant African American workers from the South.
Representative Robert Bacon of Long Island complained on the floor of the House
of Representative that these workers “were paid a very low wage . . . . that meant that
the labor conditions in that part of New York State where this hospital was to be built
were entirely upset.”15 Congressman William Upshaw of Georgia, apparently aware
that the workers in question were African Americans, responded, “You will not think
that a southern man is more than human if he smiles over the fact of your reaction to
that real problem you are confronted with in any community with a superabundance
or large aggregation of negro labor.”16 Bacon responded that “the same thing would
be true if you should bring in a lot of Mexican laborers or if you brought in any
nonunion laborers from any other State.”17
In 1928, the House held hearings on Bacon’s “Bill to Require Contractors and
Subcontractors Engaged on Public Works of the United States to Give Certain

10. Davis-Bacon Act, Pub. L. No. 71-798, ch. 411, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931), codified as amended at 40 U.S.C.
§§ 3141–3148 (2012).
11. See Employment of Labor on Federal Construction Work: Hearings on H.R. 7995 and H.R.9232
Before the H. Comm. on Labor, 71st Cong. 15 (1930).
12. Ex Parte Kuback, 85 Cal. 274 (1890); Baker v. Portland, 2 F. Cas. 472 (C.C. D. Ore. 1879). The Los
Angeles City Council also passed a similarly discriminatory public works statute in the late 19th Century.
GRACE H. STIMSON, RISE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN LOS ANGELES 100 (1955).
13. N.Y. LAWS OF 1870, ch. 385, amended by N.Y. LAWS OF 1894, ch. 622.
14. Kuback, 85 Cal. 274; Baker, 2 F. Cas. 472; People v. Warren, 34 N.Y.S. 942 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
15. Hours of Labor and Wages on Public Works: Hearing on H.R. 17069 Before the H. Comm. on Labor,
69th Cong. 2 (1927).
16. Id. at 3.
17. Id. at 4.
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Preferences in the Employment of Labor.”18 Secretary of Labor James J. Davis, who
later became the Senate co-sponsor of the Davis-Bacon Act, sent the committee a
letter supporting the bill. He recounted that a contractor from the South brought an
“entire outfit of negro laborers from the South” into Bacon's district, treated them
badly, and “employed no local labor whatsoever.”19 William J. Spencer, Secretary
of the Building Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor told the
committee:
There are complaints from all hospitals of the Veteran's Bureau against the
condition of employment on these jobs. That is true whether the job is in
the State of Washington, Oregon, Oklahoma, or Florida. The same
complaints come in. They are due to the fact that a contractor from
Alabama may go to North Port and take a crew of negro workers and house
them on the site of construction within a stockade and feed them and keep
his organization intact thereby and work that job contrary to the existing
practices in the city of New York.20
At hearings in March 1930 on two new bills to regulate labor on federal
construction projects, Representative William Henry Sproul complained that at St.
Elizabeth's Hospital the contractor paid bricklayers less than the local prevailing
wage.21 Representative John J. Cochran later explained that southern contractors
were “employing low-paid colored mechanics” at St. Elizabeth’s.22 When the Senate
held hearings in 1931 on the bill that was destined to become the Davis-Bacon Act,
American Federation of Labor president William Green testified that “[c]olored labor
is being brought in to demoralize wage rates” on federally-funded construction work
in Kingsport, Tennessee.23 T.A. Lane, of the Bricklayers' Union, told the Senators
that the Algernon Blair company was getting federal contracts and using imported
“cheap labor.”24 In the House, Congressman Miles Allgood of Alabama remarked
that Algernon Blair, a home state contractor, “has cheap colored labor that he
transports, and he puts them in cabins, and it is labor of that sort that is in competition
with white labor throughout the country.”25

18. See Preferences in the Employment of Labor on Federal Construction Works: Hearings on H.R. 11141
Before the H. Comm. on Labor, 70th Cong. (1928). The bill would have required federal contractors to give
preference to residents of the state where the work is performed who are veterans, non-veteran residents,
American citizens, and aliens, in that order.
19. Id. at 5.
20. Id. at 17.
21. Employment of Labor on Federal Construction Work: Hearings on H.R. 7995 and H.R. 9232 Before
the H. Comm. on Labor, 71st Cong. 18 (1930).
22. Id. at 26–27.
23. Wages of Laborers and Mechanics on Public Buildings: Hearings on S. 5904 Before the S. Comm. on
Manufactures, 71st Cong. 10 (1931).
24. Id. at 15–16.
25. Id. at 513.
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The Davis-Bacon Act became law soon thereafter.26 A year later, a union official
complained to the House Committee on Labor that non-enforcement of the Act
allowed a contractor to hire a mixed crew of white and African American workers:
Mr. Summers, a steel erector, violated the law by paying only $12 a week
and board to ironworkers, and he rented a shack in which he had white
men and negroes sleep together. In that instance I complained to District
of Columbia officials about the violation of the wage law, without result.27
Davis-Bacon was not solely motivated by racial animus. The construction
unions wanted to reserve federal contracting jobs for their members, regardless of the
race of their nonunion competitors. Nevertheless, given the racially exclusionary
policies of labor unions, and the fact that several Congressmen and committee
witnesses specifically complained about the use of black workers by Algernon Blair
and other federal contractors, racial animus was clearly a significant factor
motivating the passage of Davis-Bacon.
As intended, the Act eventually reserved jobs on federal construction contracts
primarily for white union men. The discriminatory effects of Davis-Bacon were built
into the structure of the law, and were destined to persist so long as discriminatory
union policies persisted. For example, many construction jobs for federal projects
were filled via union “hiring halls,” from which black workers were excluded.28
Davis-Bacon substantially contributed to a decline in African American participation
in the construction industry.29
Because of construction unions’ refusal to significantly modify longstanding
policies restricting or even prohibiting membership by non-whites, even the 1964
Civil Rights Act did not substantially ameliorate Davis-Bacon’s discriminatory
effects.30 The Nixon Administration’s Department of Labor concluded that repealing
Davis-Bacon would be an efficient means of increasing minority employment on

26. In 1964, the definition of “wages” was expanded to include benefits including health insurance,
retirement, disability, unemployment, vacation pay, and apprenticeship program costs. Pub. L. No. 88-349, 78
Stat. 238 (1964).
27. Regulation of Wages Paid to Employees by Contractors Awarded Government Building Contracts:
Hearings on S. 3847 and H.R. 11865 Before the H. Comm. on Labor, 72nd Cong. 190 (1932) (statement of Dan
M. Gayton, International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers). In 1935, Congress
responded to complaints about the difficulties of enforcing the Act’s prevailing wage requirement by
establishing a lower coverage threshold, requiring that the Department of Labor pre-determine the prevailing
wage rate, and extending the law’s coverage. WILLIAM G. WHITTAKER, CONG. RES. SERV. 94-908, DAVISBACON: THE ACT AND THE LITERATURE (2007).
28. Herman D. Bloch, Craft Unions and the Negro in Historical Perspective, 43 J. NEGRO HIST. 10, 24
(1958).
29. Roger Waldinger & Thomas Bailey, The Continuing Significance of Race: Racial Conflict and Racial
Discrimination in Construction, 19 POL. & SOC’Y 291, 301 (1991), available at
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/003232929101900302.
30. A 1968 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission study found that “the pattern of minority
employment is better for each minority group among employers who do not contract work for the government
[and are therefore not subject to Davis-Bacon] than it is among prime contractors who have agreed to
nondiscrimination clauses in their contracts with the federal government” who were subject to Davis-Bacon.
HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 389 n* (1977).
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public works projects.31 To avoid unduly offending the union voters Nixon was
wooing, however, the Department instead decided to launch affirmative-action “city
plans” to encourage the use of skilled minority workers in federal construction
projects.32 These plans, however, were a mixed success at best. A series of studies
conducted in the 1970s and ‘80s concluded that Davis-Bacon continued to have
discriminatory effects on African-American workers.33
While debate over Davis-Bacon and its potential lingering discriminatory effects
continues, occasionally Davis-Bacon advocates will support the Act for explicitly
discriminatory reasons. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, President George
W. Bush used his statutory authority to suspend the Act in the area affected by the
hurricane to facilitate cleanup and reconstruction.34 Pro-union critics expressed
outraged, with many explicitly arguing that enforcing the Act was necessary to
prevent itinerant immigrant workers from obtaining jobs on Katrina-related
projects.35 Under political pressure, Bush eventually repealed the suspension.36
II. DOES STATE PREVAILING WAGE LEGISLATION HARM MINORITIES?
As Davis-Bacon wreaked havoc on minority employment in the construction
industry, states passed and enforced their own prevailing wage laws, generally
modeled on Davis-Bacon. These laws have also been the subject of allegations that

31. PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M. STRATTON, THE NEW COLOR LINE 102 (1995).
32. Herbert Hill, The AFL-CIO and the Black Worker: Twenty-Five Years After the Merger, 10 J.
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 5, 20 (1982).
33. THIEBLOT, PREVAILING WAGE LEGISLATION, supra note 6, at 157; THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS HRD-79-18: THE DAVIS-BACON ACT SHOULD BE REPEALED
32 (1979); JOHN P. GOULD & GEORGE BITTLINGMAYER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE DAVIS-BACON ACT: AN
ANALYSIS OF PREVAILING WAGE LAWS 62 (1980); William A. Keyes, The Minimum Wage and the DavisBacon Act: Employment Effects on Minorities and Youth, 3 J. LAB. RES. 398, 407 (1982). See generally Robert
A. Levy, An Equal Protection Analysis of the Davis-Bacon Act, 1995 DET. C. L. REV. 973 (1995).
34. Proclamation 7924, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,227 (Sept. 8, 2005); see also JOHN R. LUCKEY & JON O.
SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RES. SERV. RS22265, PREVAILING WAGE REQUIREMENTS AND THE EMERGENCY
SUSPENSION OF THE DAVIS-BACON ACT (2005).
35. See Roberto Lovato, Using Illegal Labor to Clean Up After Katrina: Gulf Coast Slaves, SPIEGEL
ONLINE (Nov. 15, 2005), http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,385044,00.html. Senator Mary Landrieu
wrote to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, “While my state experiences unemployment
rates not seen since the Great Depression, it is unconscionable that illegal workers would be brought into
Louisiana, aggravating our employment crisis and depressing earnings for our workers.” JUDITH BROWNEDIANIS ET AL., AND INJUSTICE FOR ALL: WORKERS’ LIVES IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF NEW ORLEANS 12
(2006). The Democratic Senate Policy Committee complained, “[I]nstead of providing jobs to displaced local
workers, contractors have hired out-of-state migrant workers willing to accept minimal compensation.”
DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMM., BUSH ADMIN., CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS MISMANAGE HURRICANE
RECOVERY (2005). Congressman Steven LaTourette argued, “There are thousands of skilled Gulf Coast
workers who should be working to rebuild their communities, and . . . companies are passing them by and hiring
cheap unskilled illegal workers to beef up their bottom line.” Press Release, October 26, 2005, from the website
of Representative Steven LaTourette (Oct. 26, 2005). For the claim that inhibiting immigrants from obtaining
jobs on Katrina projects prevented their “exploitation,” see Haley E. Olam & Erin S. Stamper, Note, The
Suspension of the Davis Bacon Act and the Exploitation of Migrant Workers in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina,
24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 145, 146 (2006); see also D. Aaron Lacy, The Aftermath of Katrina: Race,
Undocumented Workers, and the Color of Money, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 497 (2007) (discussing
competition between African Americans and undocumented immigrants for Katrina-related jobs).
36. Griff Witte, Prevailing Wages to be Paid Again on Gulf Coast, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2005), at A10.
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they have discriminatory effects on African American and other minority workers.
This section begins with a discussion of the controversy in the economics literature
over whether empirical evidence demonstrates that state prevailing wage legislation
reduces minority employment.
Next, it discusses evidence of continuing
discrimination by construction labor unions. This section concludes with a brief
discussion of allegations that prevailing wage legislation harms minority contractors,
which in turn limits the utilization of minority workers.
A. Economic Literature on the Effects of Prevailing Wage Legislation on
Minorities
At one time, state prevailing wage laws were nearly ubiquitous, but many states
repealed their laws starting in the 1980s. By January 2017, thirty states still had
prevailing wage legislation.37 The repeals provided researchers with a data set they
could use to explore the impact of prevailing wage legislation on minority
employment.
The results of this research have been mixed. Some articles conclude that such
legislation harms minority workers, while others (almost all by researchers associated
with the University of Utah) conclude that such legislation is essentially neutral. No
academic articles appear to argue that prevailing wage legislation disproportionately
benefits minority workers.
Daniel Kessler and Lawrence Katz analyzed Current Population Survey data and
Census data and found that the relative wages of construction workers decline slightly
after the repeal of a state prevailing wage law.38 However, “the small overall impact
of law repeal masks substantial differences in outcomes for different groups of
construction employees. Repeal is associated with a sizable reduction in the union
wage premium and an appreciable narrowing of the black/non-black wage
differential for construction workers.”39 The authors note that repealing prevailing
wage legislation also raises the wages African American construction workers get
relative to other African American workers, which implies that repeal of prevailing
wage laws may benefit African American construction workers.40
Economist Armand Thieblot, a long-time critic of prevailing wage legislation,
found based on 1990 census data “a strongly inverse correlation . . . between black
employment and strength of prevailing wage law.”41 Thieblot found that while
African American employment in construction is generally below black employment
in other sectors, African American employment in construction is closer to average
in states with no prevailing wage law, lower in states that have prevailing wage laws,
and progressively lower in states with progressively stronger prevailing wage laws.42
37. DEP’T OF LAB., supra note 5.
38. Daniel P. Kessler & Lawrence F. Katz, Prevailing Wage Laws and Construction Labor Markets, 54
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 259 (2001).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 273.
41. A. J. Thieblot, Prevailing Wage Laws and Black Employment in the Construction Industry, 20 J. LAB.
RES. 155 (1999).
42. Id.
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In other words, the stronger a state prevailing wage law, the weaker African
American employment in the construction industry.
Economists Hamid Azari-rad and Peter Philips (an outspoken supporter of
prevailing wage laws) of the University of Utah responded to Thieblot’s article by
arguing that the 1970 Census data shows that African American construction workers
happened to be relatively abundant in states that had prevailing wage laws at the time,
and would later repeal their prevailing wage laws.43 According to Azari-rad and
Philips, if one only looked at the 1990 data, one might think that the relative
abundance of African American construction workers in certain states was due to the
absence of a prevailing wage law.44 In fact, however, that abundance also existed
when prevailing wage legislation was in effect.45 This suggests that studies like
Thieblot’s that simply compare prevailing wage states to non-prevailing wage states,
without considering whether these states have other relevant labor market
differences, are not good evidence of either the strength, or even existence, of a causal
relationship between prevailing wage legislation and black unemployment.46
Thieblot asserted that Azari-rad and Philips reached their conclusion by cherrypicking data, accomplished by excluding eight southern states from their data.47
Thieblot pointed out that those eight states contain 97.6% of the African Americans
who work in construction in states without prevailing wage laws, and almost half of
all African American construction workers.48 Thieblot acknowledged that some nonprevailing wage law states had relatively high African American employment in
construction even when those states had prevailing wage laws.49 He argued,
however, that this is just a proxy for the level of labor unionism. States with relatively
high levels of African American employment in construction also tended to have
weaker unions, which is why it was easier to repeal prevailing wage legislation in
those states.50 But the weakness of unions also meant that when the prevailing wage
laws were repealed, African Americans were in an especially good position to
benefit.51
Another University of Utah economist concluded in 2003 that there are
significant differences in apprenticeship rates in the construction industry for
minorities among states that have strong prevailing wage laws, weak prevailing wage
laws, and no such laws, but there is no consistent pattern. Hence, the data does not

43. Hamid Azari-rad & Peter Philips, Race and Prevailing Wage Laws in the Construction Industry:
Comment on Thieblot, 24 J. LAB. RES. 161 (2003).
44. Id. at 162.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. A.J. Thieblot, Race and Prevailing Wage Laws in the Construction Industry: Reply to Azari-Rad and
Philips, 24 J. LAB. RES. 169, 171 (2003).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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lend itself to any obvious interpretation.52 The author concludes that there is no
evidence that prevailing wage laws stifle minority participation in apprenticeships.53
Two years later, economist Dale Belman published a book chapter
acknowledging that there is a negative correlation between state prevailing wage
legislation and minority employment.54 However, Belman claims that this
correlation disappears if one controls for the racial composition of the states’ nonconstruction labor force.55 More generally, he claims that studies suggesting the
prevailing wage laws limit minority employment are derived from naive models that
do not adequately account for relevant factors beyond those laws.56
Also in 2005, Mark Price, a student of Professor Philips, completed a Ph.D.
dissertation on state prevailing wage laws.57 Based on data collected in the Current
Population Survey between 1977 and 2002, Price found no evidence that African
American construction workers received an increase in hourly wages or benefits
coverage as a result of the repeal of prevailing wage laws.58 However, such repeals
did lead to a decline in unionization among less-skilled construction workers.59
Because African American construction workers are disproportionately less-skilled,
repeal of prevailing wage laws led to a disproportionate decline in African American
membership in construction unions.60
An analysis undertaken by economist Elizabeth Roistacher and others on behalf
of the Citizens Housing & Planning Council in New York City found that extending
a prevailing wage mandate to low-income housing projects would have a strongly
adverse impact on the largely minority labor force that had been engaged in that
work.61
The researchers found that there is continuing—albeit subtle—
discrimination in favor of white construction workers in New York unions that
benefit from prevailing wage legislation, and that the imposition of prevailing wage
requirements is a large hindrance to minority-owned firms.62 “Few such firms,” they
wrote, “have the back-office capacity to comply with the complex reporting and
oversight requirements of prevailing wages.”63 Consequently, they concluded, if

52. Cihan Bilginsoy, Wage Regulation and Training: The Impact of State Prevailing Wage Laws on
Apprenticeship (Univ. of Utah Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 2003-08, 2003),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/23696701_Wage_Regulation_and_Training_The_Impact_of_State_
Prevailing_Wage_Laws_on_Apprenticeship.
53. Id. at 20.
54. Dale Belman, Prevailing Wage Laws, Unions, and Minority Employment in Construction: A Historical
and Empirical Analysis, in THE ECONOMICS OF PREVAILING WAGE LAWS 101, 102 (Hamid Azari-Rad et al.
eds., 2005).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Mark Price, State Prevailing Wage Laws and Construction Labor Markets (Dec. 2005) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utah) (on file with the Department of Economics, University of Utah).
58. Id. at v.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. ELIZABETH A. ROISTACHER ET AL., PREVAILING WISDOM: THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF PREVAILING
WAGES ON AFFORDABLE HOUSING 2 (2008), http://chpcny.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/PrevailingWisdom-web-version1.pdf.
62. Id. at 13.
63. Id. at 15.
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New York were to mandate the payment of prevailing wages on low-income housing
projects, many African American and Latino workers who currently are employed on
such projects would lose their jobs.64
A recent article on prevailing wage legislation and minority employment
expressed skepticism about the validity and persuasiveness of the empirical research
of the effect of prevailing wage legislation on minority employment, whichever side
of the debate it comes from.65 The author argued that the “use of statistics in
evaluating the construction industry is difficult, particularly if the analysis does not
distinguish between the individual trade disciplines.”66 He suggested that “[a]n
accurate statistical analysis regarding whether minorities and women have fair access
to construction opportunities must be done on a trade-by-trade basis in each county
or market being studied during the same time frame,” and that, “[a] good way to
survey participation of minorities on Davis-Bacon-funded projects is to compare
demographic information derived from payroll reports with area demographic
data.”67 However, economists studying the issue have yet to undertake such a
study.68
Most recently, a University of Montana master’s thesis, comparing employment
data from states that repealed their prevailing wage legislation with data from states
that did not, concluded that repealing a prevailing wage law is associated with an
across-the-board increase in employment.69 One subgroup of workers, Hispanics,
benefits significantly more than average from repeal.70
B. Do Labor Unions Still Discriminate Against Minority Workers?
Defenders of prevailing wage legislation might argue that whatever
discriminatory effects prevailing wage laws may have had in the past were a product
of historical patterns of discrimination in labor unions that no longer exist. Unions
not only do not exclude members of minority groups any more, under public and
government pressure they often undertake affirmative action policies seeking to place
members of minority groups in apprenticeships and ultimately in full-time union jobs.
Past research, however, suggests that affirmative action policies in cities like
New York ultimately did little to provide long-term union employment for minority
construction workers. The problems ranged from union intransigence regarding
discrimination to unions’ declining share of the construction labor market, which left
little room for new workers in a system dominated by hiring preferences based on

64. Id. at 18.
65. Dominic Ozanne, Who Promised Fair? Improving the Construction Industry Part II, 63 LAB. L. J. 55,
56 (2012).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Portia Anne Conant, Employment Effects of Prevailing Wage Laws 52 (Apr. 2016) (unpublished
Master’s Thesis, Montana State University) (on file with author).
70. Id.
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seniority.71 Ironically, the availability of a pool of nonunion minority workers to
contractors in the 1970s and beyond due to union discrimination strengthened the
hand of nonunion employers and helped cause the significant decline in the
percentage of construction workers represented by unions.72
Surprisingly, an extensive literature search found no broad academic study of
discrimination in construction unions since Waldinger and Bailey’s 1991 study of the
persistence of racial discrimination in New York unions.73 There are occasional
anecdotal reports of discrimination in the academic literature. For example, the
authors of a chapter of a book about race and migration in New York reported that
“many Jamaican men report strong barriers to joining white-dominated skilled trades
and construction unions and racial discrimination in finding jobs as contractors.”74
Beyond the academic literature, one finds occasional anecdotal reports of
persistent discrimination in labor unions, especially in the New York City area.75 For
example, one activist claims that while New York construction unions have become
somewhat more racially integrated in the last twenty years, the Carpenters and
Laborer unions, which represent relatively low-paid workers, have the bulk of

71. Waldinger & Bailey, supra note 29; see also N.Y.C COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BUILDING
BARRIERS: DISCRIMINATION IN NEW YORK CITY’S CONSTRUCTION TRADES (1993), available at
http://www.talkinghistory.org/sisters/images/building_barriers.pdf.
72. Jeff Grabelsky & Mark Erlich, Recent Innovations in the Building Trades, in WHICH DIRECTION FOR
ORGANIZED LABOR? ESSAYS ON ORGANIZING, OUTREACH, AND INTERNAL TRANSFORMATIONS 167, 172
(Bruce Nissen, ed. 1999); see also Nancy A. Banks, The Last Bastion of Discrimination: The New York City
Building Trades and the Struggle over Affirmative Action, 1961-1976 at 376 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with author) (“Indeed, there is a very real connection between the
building trades’ restrictive hiring practices and the transformation of the construction industry over the last three
decades. In that time, an increasing number of minority workers, unable to break into the building trades, have
had little choice but to take jobs with non-union contractors at substantially lower wages.”).
73. Waldinger & Bailey, supra note 29.
74. Philip Kasinitz & Milton Vickerman, Ethnic Niches and Racial Traps: Jamaicans in the New York
Regional Economy, in MIGRATION, TRANSNATIONALIZATION, AND RACE IN A CHANGING NEW YORK 191, 203
(Hector R. Cordero-Guzman et al., eds. 2001).
75. See generally Richard Berman, NY Construction Unions Make It Hard for Minorities to Move up, N.Y.
POST (Dec. 22, 2015), http://nypost.com/2015/12/22/ny-construction-unions-make-it-hard-for-minorities-tomove-up.
Philadelphia also seems to have more than its fair share of problems with discriminatory building trade
unions. See, e.g., Solomon Jones, Building Trade Unions and Rebuild—a Slippery Slope, PHILA. INQUIRER
(June 27, 2017), http://www.philly.com/philly/columnists/solomon_jones/building-trade-unions-and-rebuild-aslippery-slope-20170627.html; Matthew Rothstein, Racism, Discrimination Complaints Mount against Local
Construction
Union,
BISNOW
PHILA.
(July
26,
2017),
https://www.bisnow.com/philadelphia/news/construction-development/racism-discrimination-builders-unionlocal-542-77015; Hayden Mitman, Fixing Philly: Bringing More Minorities into Trade Unions, METRO (July
5, 2017), available at https://www.metro.us/news/local-news/philadelphia/fixing-philly-bringing-moreminorities-trade-unions.
I suspect that New York and Philadelphia get disproportionate attention because they are two of the few
cities that still have a large union presence in the construction industry. Nationwide, less than fourteen percent
of construction workers are unionized. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNION MEMBERS SUMMARY (2018),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. By contrast, over one-quarter of construction workers in
New York City are union members. Bob Hennelly, Unions, Construction Companies are Playing the Blame
Game
over
Worker
Deaths
in
NYC,
CITY
&
ST.
N.Y.
(Aug.
29,
2016),
https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/politics/new-york-city/unions,-construction-companies-are-playingblame-game-over-worker-deaths-in-nyc.html Moreover, union contractors seem to dominate lucrative public
construction contract work.
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minority workers, while unions of more skilled workers are still overwhelmingly
white.76 When asked to point to progress in ending discrimination, union leaders and
politicians often point to apprenticeship programs run by the unions and geared
toward minority workers.77 However, few of these apprentices ever get steady union
work.78 Meanwhile, “the workforce on the non union side is overwhelmingly
minority . . . . mostly Latino, with sizable numbers of Black, Chinese, and South
Asian workers as well.”79
Litigation against discriminatory labor unions has also persisted. Charles Brown,
an African American certified welder, received a settlement in 1991 against the
Ironworkers as the result of a settlement of a race discrimination lawsuit filed by the
EEOC against Ironworkers Local 580. The court found that the union violated a 1978
court order banning discriminatory job referrals. The court also found the union
guilty of retaliatory harassment.80
Brown received a $40,000 damages award, but his ordeal was not yet over.
Despite seeking work at the union’s hiring hall three or four times a week, he received
only about two months’ worth of work referrals over nine years, while enduring
threats and blacklistings.81 He therefore sued the union for violating the consent
decree.82
Angel Vasquez, another plaintiff in the lawsuit who is of Hispanic descent, also
reported that he almost never got chosen for work when he went to the hiring hall.
76. GREGORY BUTLER, DISUNITED BROTHERHOODS: RACE, RACKETEERING AND THE FALL OF THE NEW
YORK CONSTRUCTION UNIONS 9 (2006).
77. E.g., Press Release, City of New York, Mayor Bloomberg, Congressman Rangel, Comptroller
Thompson, Building and Construction Trade Council President Malloy and Non-traditional Employment for
Women Board Chair Hayes Announce 10 Initiatives of Mayor’s Commission on Construction Opportunity (Oct.
5, 2005), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/383-05/mayor-bloomberg-congressman-rangelcomptroller-thompson-building-construction-trade-council (announcing that “the unions in the City’s Building
and Construction Trades Council are making an unprecedented commitment to reserve over 40% of the slots in
their apprenticeship programs by the year 2010 for veterans, women, high school graduates, and economically
disadvantaged New Yorkers.”).
78. BUTLER, supra note 76, at 13–15; see also NYC Construction Union Leadership: Male, Pale, and
Stale, LABORPAINS (Sept. 28, 2015), http://laborpains.org/2015/09/28/nyc-construction-union-leadershipmale-pale-and-stale/ (noting that unionized African American workers hold jobs that pay about 20% less than
jobs held by whites).
79. BUTLER, supra note 76, at 19.
Women also complain of discrimination by construction unions. For example, one female construction
worker described her union’s attitude towards workplace discrimination as follows: “I would go to jobs and the
Business Agents were, to put it quite bluntly, very hostile. And the more persistent I was, the more they made
it clear that they were not going to do too much to help me and that it didn’t matter what the laws were. It didn’t
matter if the jobs were supposed to have women on them. The contractors are not responsible to the union hall.
And the officers in the union are not responsible directly to the members. This is what happens in practice.”
Jane Latour, Live! From New York: Women Construction Workers in Their Own Words, 42 LAB. HIST. 179,
185 (2001). See also Kris Paap, How Good Men of the Union Justify Inequality: Dilemmas of Race and Labor
in the Building Trades, 33 LAB. STUD. J. 371, 376 (2008) (documenting underrepresentation of blacks and
women in the construction trades and the role of labor unions in preserving discriminatory status quo); David
Crary, Few Women in Construction; Recruiting Efforts Rise, USA TODAY (Sept. 1, 2014),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/09/01/few-women-in-construction-recruiting-effortsrise/14870787/ (noting allegations of widespread hostility to and harassment of women construction workers).
80. Jack Newfield, 2 Brave Men Battle Racist Union, N.Y. POST (July 26, 1998).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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Despite regularly showing up at the hiring hall, most of his work was from referrals
from friends, not the union. Brown and Vasquez’s attorney, Ramon Jiminez, filed a
motion with the court overseeing the earlier Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) settlement arguing that his clients should be recognized as
third-party beneficiaries of the settlement agreement, and asking for an order finding
Local 580 in civil contempt for violating the court’s orders that accompanied the
settlement. The plaintiffs at the same time filed a new Title VII lawsuit for race
discrimination. The EEOC meanwhile commenced an investigation into Local 80’s
compliance with the applicable court orders.83
For unclear procedural reasons, the action eventually shifted to an EEOC claim
that local 580 violated the 1991 consent decree by discriminating against minority
workers in Westchester County and New York City with regard to job referrals and
by failing to adhere to the apprentice-to-journeyperson ratio required by the consent
decree. The parties settled the latter claim when Local 580 agreed to a settlement
worth $4.5 million, which would, among other things, increase the Local’s budget
for its Apprentice Training Facility.84
With regard to referrals, the EEOC claimed that there was a substantial disparity
between the opportunities given to minority workers and white workers. In 2007, the
EEOC reached a settlement with Local 580 in which the latter agreed to pay the
EEOC $800,000 and provide “substantial remedial relief” to settle the case.85 The
case was not fully settled, however. The EEOC refused to drop its lawsuit until the
local showed substantial progress for several years in abandoning discriminatory
practices.86
Meanwhile, each of the individual plaintiffs represented by Jiminez was offered
a settlement in 2003 based on formula agreed upon by the union and the EEOC. Each
of the plaintiffs accepted the settlement except for Brown, who found the offer of
$42,000 inadequate and instead chose to continue the litigation without an attorney,
requesting a contempt award of over six million dollars.87 After much additional
procedural wrangling, in 2011 a magistrate judge recommended that the court award
Brown the original $42,000.88 It was so ordered by Judge Lewis Kaplan, and the

83. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers,
Local 580, 139 F. Supp. 2d 512, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
84. Press Release, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Obtains a $4.5 Million Settlement
with Local 580 Ornamental Ironworkers (July 31, 2003), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/7-3103b.cfm.
85. Press Release, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Local 580, Ornamental Ironworkers to
Pay $800,000
to
Partially
Settle
Contempt
Action
by EEOC
(May 8,
2007),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/5-8-07.cfm.
86. Id.
87. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Int’l Ass’n Bridge Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers Local
580, No. 71 Civ. 2877 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2008), available at https://casetext.com/case/eeoc-v-internationalassociation-of-bridge-structural.
88. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge Structural and Ornamental
Ironworkers Local 580, 2011 WL 1219261 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2011).
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litigation ended.89 However, EEOC monitoring of Local 580's compliance with its
obligations under its various settlement agreements continues to this day.90
The Sheet Metal Workers have also continued to find themselves defending the
union in court from claims of discrimination. The EEOC first sued Local 28 for race
discrimination in the early 1970s and has been in on-and-off litigation with the union
over its violations of the resulting court orders ever since, resulting in a series of
contempt orders against the local.91 In 2004, the Hispanic Society brought an action
as plaintiff-intervenors on behalf of itself and a certified class of all black and
Hispanic persons who are or were at any time since 1984 members, either as
journeypersons or apprentices, of Local 28 and who are or were “underemployed” as
compared to their white counterparts.92
The plaintiffs claimed that statistical analysis of the 1991 to 2003 period showed
that statistically significant work hours disparities between white and nonwhite
workers persisted, alleged that the disparities were attributable to race, and alleged
that Local 28 failed to make diligent efforts to remedy these disparities.93 The court
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding:
Local 28’s lack of engagement in rectifying discriminatory practices has
had a severe detrimental effect not only on its nonwhite union members
but also on the union as a whole. Local 28 has endured years of litigation,
with all the attendant costs both to its financial resources and its reputation.
For this, the union has only itself to blame. Perpetual resistance and footdragging on the union's part will not cow the court from using the full
range of powers at its disposal to ensure that Local 28 fulfills its courtordered responsibilities. Sadly, the union continues to evade its
obligations and the court has no choice but to hold Local 28 in civil
contempt, once again.94
In January 2008, a federal judge approved a $6.2 million settlement.95 “This
lawsuit has lasted 37 years because for a very long time the union’s old guard resisted
change and would not bring itself into compliance with the court order,” remarked
Jyotin Hamid, a partner with Debevoise & Plimpton, which represented the black and
Hispanic workers in the case.96 The EEOC continues to monitor Local 28 for
compliance with the settlement, and the union was the defendant in a lawsuit by a
contractor for failing to meet its obligations under the apprenticeship provisions of
89. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers
Local 580, 2011 WL 1236592 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2011).
90. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Local 368, 2015 WL 749133 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2015).
91. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Local 638, 2005 WL 823915 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2005).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Steven Greenhouse, Settlement in Bias Suit that Stalled for 37 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/16/nyregion/16union.html. One of the relevant orders, dealing with back pay
claim
from
1984
to
1991,
can
be
found
at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1119&context=condec.
96. Id.
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the settlement as recently as 2012.97 A special master continues to monitor the
compliance of several other union locals with various anti-discrimination orders and
settlements extending back decades.98
Lawrence Mishel of the pro-union Economic Policy Institute contends that
despite reports of persistent discrimination, African Americans are a higher
percentage of unionized construction workers in New York City than of non-union
workers.99 Mishel, however, simply presents his conclusions, and there is no easy
way to check whether his analysis is consistent with the underlying data.
Nor is there any way to tell what extent the data reflects actual improved
conditions for black workers on the ground.100 For example, some African
Americans have reported that they are members of a building trades union, but rarely
get work through the union.101 Finally, as Mishel acknowledges, Hispanics and other
minorities (primarily Asian Americans) are vastly better represented in the nonunion
sector of New York’s construction industry than in the union sector. Over 75% of
nonunion construction workers are members of minority groups, compared to 55%
of unionized construction workers.102
C. Prevailing Wage Law’s Effect on Minority Contractors
Regardless of whether prevailing wage legislation harms minority workers,
minority contractors allege that such legislation has discriminatory effects on them.
As noted previously, Roistacher and colleagues found that minority contractors find
it extremely difficult to compete for government contracts because of massive
paperwork and other expensive requirements.103
Harry Alford, president and CEO of the National Black Chamber of Commerce,
has stated that approximately 98% of construction companies owned by African
Americans and Hispanics are nonunion and are frozen out by project labor
agreements that implicitly require union labor.104 The same dynamic would apply to

97. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Local 638, 2012 WL 3594245 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2012). The
court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, and it’s unclear what became of the lawsuit thereafter.
98. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Local 368, 2015 WL 749133 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2015)
(approving a fee increase for the special master in question).
99. LAWRENCE MISHEL, DIVERSITY IN THE NEW YORK CITY UNION AND NONUNION CONSTRUCTION
SECTORS (2017), http://www.epi.org/publication/diversity-in-the-nyc-construction-union-and-nonunionsectors/.
100. Cf. Eric Durkin, EXCLUSIVE: NAACP Claims Building Trades Council Misleads New Yorkers About
Diversity in Construction Unions, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/newyork/exclusive-naacp-rips-diversity-nyc-construction-unions-article-1.2415475.
101. See BUTLER, supra note 76, at 62–90.
102. See MISHEL, supra note 99.
103. ROISTACHER ET AL., supra note 61, at 15.
104. Press Release, Couch White, LLP, The National Black Chamber of Commerce and Its New York
Affiliates Submit Amicus Brief Objecting to Racially Discriminatory Effects of Union-Only Project Labor
Management (July 10, 2013), available at https://kingcounty.gov/~/media/depts/executive-services/childrenfamily-justice-center/documents/EOEP/Doc_1203_NBCC_Amicus__PLA_Discriminatory_201307.ashx?la=en.
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prevailing wage legislation that favors union contractors.105 Alford also quoted
Anthony Robinson, President of the Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and
Education Fund, who testified in the House of Representatives that “the construction
trade labor unions have been, and remain, a serious obstacle to the participation of
minority contractors and workers in the construction industry.”106
CONCLUSION
Historically, prevailing wage legislation has been a disaster for minority
construction workers. Such laws bias the labor market in favor of labor unions, and
construction labor unions have been among the most vociferously exclusionary
entities in the United States. Persistent discrimination lawsuits, combined with
anecdotal reports of discrimination, suggest that significant discrimination continues
to exist in construction unions. Given that prevailing wage laws tend to operate to
exclude nonunion labor in favor of union labor, this works to the detriment of
minority workers who are subject to union discrimination.
Regardless of intentional discrimination, prevailing wage laws give an advantage
to union contractors and labor unions, while people of color are much better
represented in the nonunion sector of the industry. The seniority system favors older
white male workers who received their jobs when discrimination was still rampant
over younger, more ethnically diverse construction workers.
The economic literature on the effects of prevailing wage laws is divided
between those who conclude that prevailing wage laws exclude minority workers and
those who believe that such exclusion is unproven. There do not appear to be any
articles addressing in any detail the effect of prevailing wage laws on minority-owned
contracting companies, but given that they are overwhelmingly nonunion, such laws
almost certainly serve to disproportionately exclude such companies. If so, this
would contribute to the discriminatory effects of prevailing wage laws on minority
workers.

105. Brief for The Nat’l Black Chamber of Com., Inc. et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants,
Lancaster Dev., Inc. v. McDonald, 112 A.D.3d 1260 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (No. 4745-12) [hereinafter Amicus
Brief]. The defendants were granted a motion to dismiss because the court found that the plaintiffs had failed
to establish “standing.” Lancaster Dev., Inc. v. McDonald, 112 A.D.3d 1260 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
106. Amicus Brief, supra note 105, at 3.

